manufacturing base. Populists appeal to older people in the population and to those with less education. Anti-immigrant campaigns and proposals are another powerful draw for populists, even in regions with few immigrants and refugees in the population. Karl Polanyi's "double-movement" of backlash against global markets and against globalization's rapid, radical disruption of social life seems once again at work producing authoritarian anti-liberal politics. 2 The economic and social circumstances that give rise to populism today and those of the 1940s and 1950s that Hoffmann studied are of course vastly different. But the critical similarity that links the French movements that Hoffmann studied to populism today is large-scale anger against an elite. As Bonikowski and Gidron suggest in their study of populist politics in the United States, populism can most usefully be defined as a form of political interaction "predicated on a moral vilification of elites and a concomitant veneration of the common people." 3 Hoffmann's essential insight is that this anger is to be understood, not simply in terms of personal economic or psychological or cultural characteristics of the citizen, but as a collective reaction to failures of representation. Democracies become vulnerable to populist politics when parties 2 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston : Beacon Press, 1944) .
3 Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron, "The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952 -1996 ," Social Forces 94 (2016 ): 4, accessed July 19, 2016 .1093/sf/sov120. Justin Gest, The New White Minority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
The point the cartoon makes is that populist politics is not a politics of interest representation. It's the politics you get when interest representation has failed.
It's not that the sheep believes the wolf will act in the sheep's interest. It's that voting for the wolf gets back at the shepherd-even at the expense of the sheep's eventual fate as dinner for the wolf.
Given the recurrent themes of economic injustice and cultural despair across countries in which populist parties are rising, it is understandable that most analyses have focused on the economic and social characteristics of the individuals who are drawn to populist parties. But this one-eyed focus on individuals obscures other significant features of the rise of populist politics. and of the Poujadists should be understood as responses to the fact that these channels did not work for these groups. Their anti-system anger was fueled by frustration over their inability to get their interests onto the political agenda.
In the case of Vichy, as Hoffmann described, conservatives had been deeply frustrated in the last twenty years of the Third Republic by the fact that access to state power required either organizing parties with a mass base-which conservatives in the main saw as dangerous and destabilizing to social order and refused --or else organizing strong economic interest groups, as the unions had done on the Left, and at that, too, for various reasons, conservatives had failed.
On both these fronts the conservatives had been outdone by the Left and felt increasingly powerless and desperate. In the case of the Poujadists, in contrast to the Vichy conservatives, while there was a basic acceptance of the Republic and of parliamentarism, there was a similar sense of impotence and rage about getting the system to work for their interests, about getting the system to protect them. Although these attitudes and values have been around for a long time, they appear to have been reactivated or leveraged into greater salience by the economic strains that globalization has imposed on these communities and by a set of political shifts in national politics that makes these communities feel even more marginalized and looked down on. Among these political shifts, perhaps the most painful is the rise in social status of the very groups to whom poor whites once felt superior and the conviction that these groups are rising because of favoritism from national government. Arlie Russell Hochschild describes that it feels to poor whites in Louisiana as if they are in a long line leading towards the American Dream and patiently waiting for economic betterment, while things seem to be getting worse not better, and while other people---blacks, women, immigrants, gays, refugees--cut ahead in line helped unfairly by special political dispensations. Even the government's environmental policies seem determined to advance animals ahead of humans-so "unbelievably, standing ahead of you in line is a brown pelican, fluttering its long, oil-drenched wings."
12
These economic and cultural explanations of populism are powerful and largely mutually complementary, but they also seem incomplete. The phenomenon we want to explain-the recent surge in populism-is a radical break, while the economic and cultural factors have been long in the making without producing anything that even began to look like an advanced anticipation of the Brexit and Trump victories. It's on this point that Stanley
Hoffmann's focus on the institutions of representation seems relevant. We need to look at the state of the institutional conduits through which the interests and values that recently have been expressed through populist voting used to be channeled. Such an exploration ought to be the agenda of a major research project; here I can only point to some obvious facts about the decay, obsolescence, and outright expropriation of the institutions through which the discontent of less-privileged groups in the United States used to be expressed and brought into centers of public decision making.
In the United States, these institutional conduits were mainly the unions and 
